Fundos de Investimento ( Mutual Funds - SICAV )

[Bedrock 137]

há 7 horas, Vidolz disse:

Eish que tombo hoje 😮

Só é pena os gurus do forum, especialistas em track record, não terem previsto ontem este afundanço, mas eu vou já dar a resposta deles: O afundanço de hoje numa carteira de buy and hold a 40 anos, tem um peso similar ao peso de uma mosca em cima de um cão de 40 kg. Mas depois eu penso cá para mim: Como é que esses gurus podem garantir que mesmo um jovem investidor com 30 anos, pode ainda estar vivo aos 70 anos? A resposta deles: Se já tiver falecido, fica para os herdeiros legais. Mas aí eu volto a pensar: Mas se esse investidor não tiver herdeiros legais ou ilegais? Resposta deles: Sempre me pode fazer seu herdeiro, porque iria rentabilizar o seu capital melhor que o Estado. Aí eu parei de pensar, porque já tinha os neurónios sobreaquecidos e a qualquer momento poderiam derreter, pela lei de Joule, tal era o fluxo de eletrões a passarem naqueles micro fios condutores. 

Editado 29 de Outubro de 2020 por Bedrock

[Les Paul 29]

há 28 minutos, Mouro Emprestado disse:

Já estamos nos 2300 ? 

Será que perdi a oportunidade para shortar com alavancagem? 😄 

Eu comprei há uns dias mas foi na conta demo da trading 212 🤣

[Rick Lusitano 2115]

há 27 minutos, Les Paul disse:

Eu comprei há uns dias mas foi na conta demo da trading 212 🤣

Já fiz disso na conta real. Dá uns trocos interessantes, mas cuidado em ter essas posições muito tempo abertas. Para longo prazo é só perder dinheiro. E de um dia para o outro, o ETF faz o reset das posições. O Short 3x Nasdaq é USD, e o USD tem levado no lombo.

 

Eu preferia fechar todos os dias, essas posições. (As bolsas aonde negociam esses ETFs fecham mais cedo, são bolsas europeias)

E no dia seguinte comprava se valia a pena. Até porque não há fees Na T212.

[Patanisca 1223]

Só para contextualizar as coisas.

O SP500 está 47% acima do que estava no dia 23 de Março (bottom da pandemia). E só passaram 219 dias.

E depois há o Nasdaq e os outros...

[Les Paul 29]

há 4 horas, Rick Lusitano disse:

Já fiz disso na conta real. Dá uns trocos interessantes, mas cuidado em ter essas posições muito tempo abertas. Para longo prazo é só perder dinheiro. E de um dia para o outro, o ETF faz o reset das posições. O Short 3x Nasdaq é USD, e o USD tem levado no lombo.

 

Eu preferia fechar todos os dias, essas posições. (As bolsas aonde negociam esses ETFs fecham mais cedo, são bolsas europeias)

E no dia seguinte comprava se valia a pena. Até porque não há fees Na T212.

Pois ainda não percebi muito bem essa questão do reset que falas. Já vi aqui algures fórum algumas discussões sobre os ETFs alavancados mas ainda não me debrucei muito sobre o assunto. Mas na prática qual seria a diferença entre deixar a posição aberta de um dia para o outro e fazer aquilo que estás a dizer de fechar a posição e abrir no dia seguinte?

[Rick Lusitano 2115]

há 1 minuto, Les Paul disse:

Pois ainda não percebi muito bem essa questão do reset que falas. Já vi aqui algures fórum algumas discussões sobre os ETFs alavancados mas ainda não me debrucei muito sobre o assunto. Mas na prática qual seria a diferença entre deixar a posição aberta de um dia para o outro e fazer aquilo que estás a dizer de fechar a posição e abrir no dia seguinte?

Alguém colocou um artigo ou imagem a explicar isso muito bem no tópico velho dos ETFs (penso que nas últimas páginas).

Basicamente os ETF usam derivados overnight para obter a alvancagem (tanto nos ETF long como nos shorts). Por isso, a denominação "Daily", todos os dias, tem de comprar/vender posições dos derivados consoante a valorização do dia anterior. Por isso também os ETFs alvancados não dão retornos consoante as alvancagens anunciadas, ficando sempre abaixo delas.

[-------- 2582]

https://pt.fundspeople.com/news/conheca-os-requisitos-que-um-fundo-deve-cumprir-para-obter-5-estrelas-morningstar

[EagleOne 58]

Bancos centrais vendem ouro pela primeira vez depois de 2010... 

O ouro depois da alta em Agosto já estava a descer, com este sell-off dos bancos deve descer ainda mais.

[Rick Lusitano 2115]

Sobre outros riscos na gestão de carteiras:

Asset managers warned over ‘insufficient’ climate risk reporting

https://www.ft.com/content/519177ed-857a-4263-9f1a-a2ce8b70aaf7

 

[Rick Lusitano 2115]

Para que não digam que não sou vosso amigo:

(Principalmente para o pessoal de IT, devido ao trabalho remoto.)

 

Citação

Ilhas Caimão procuram trabalhadores bem remunerados para o seu território paradisíaco

Se ganha pelo menos 100 mil dólares anuais (mais de 84 mil euros) pode agora mudar-se para as Ilhas Caimão e trabalhar remotamente durante dois anos, enquanto usufrui de uma paisagem paradisíaca.

https://www.jornaldenegocios.pt/economia/detalhe/ilhas-caimao-procuram-trabalhadores-bem-remunerados-para-o-seu-territorio-paradisiaco

[fousa 106]

só faltam mesmo os 100 mil dólares anuais 🤣 

Um belo sitio para confinar  😎

[Bedrock 137]

 

Editado 29 de Outubro de 2020 por Bedrock

[Bedrock 137]

[Bedrock 137]

Expansionism: The Impact of the Fed’s Monetary Regime on the Equity Risk Premium.

Investors allocate their assets into different classes both to reduce risk through portfolio diversification and to increase returns by changing these allocations. Financial assets have traditionally been divided into stocks, bonds and bills; non-traditional assets include housing, commodities, collectibles and other investments.

One of the primary questions the asset allocation process has raised is, what is the value of the Equity Risk Premium (ERP) as measured by the relative returns to equities against a risk-free investment, such as Treasury Bills in the short run and Government Bonds in the long run?

Risk and return are positively correlated. Equities are riskier than bonds and bills and should provide a higher rate of return to compensate investors for this risk. Over long periods of time, this has been true. Although risk is relative, the risk continuum starts at Government T-Bills (“cash”) and moves to Government Notes and Bonds, Corporate Bonds, Preferred Stocks and Common Stocks. The equity risk premium measures how much extra return investors should receive for the additional risk of moving up this risk continuum.

Most research has focused on determining the value of the ERP assuming it is a constant that could be directly related to the level of increased risk. Estimates of the equity risk premium are generally in the range of 3-7% depending upon the time period covered. However, the relative risk of stocks and bonds, as well as the perception of this risk changes over time. It is not fixed.

There is no agreement on the value of the ERP, primarily because historical comparisons of relative returns between stocks, bonds and bills vary greatly over time as well as between countries. Moreover, in some cases, as in Japan between 1989 and 2013, the total return to government bonds has exceeded the return to equities over a period of 20 years or more. So if the ERP is not constant, why does it change over time, or does it even exist?

It is the argument of this paper that a fixed value for the ERP may not even exist for two reasons. First, it is not possible to arbitrage the ERP, even when it significantly deviates from its long-term average. There is no historical evidence that it is possible to go long one asset class and short the other and profit from this arbitrage. The evidence for this is that the ERP can significantly differ from its long-term average for decades at a time. If the ERP could be arbitraged, such profitable opportunities would be eliminated more quickly than they are. The example of Japan in which the ERP was 11.14 between 1950 and 1989 and -5.92 from 1990 to 2013 is the best example of this.

The primary reason for this result is that equity returns are primarily driven by the growth in corporate profits and nominal bond yields by both inflation and the growth in the economy as a whole. Moreover, the business cycle driving equities is substantially shorter than the policy cycle driving bond yields. While a bull or bear market in equities may last two to five years, a bull or bear market in fixed income can last two or three decades. A fixed ERP assumes it is exogenous when in fact it may be endogenous and influenced by monetary and fiscal policy.

There is no fixed value for the Equity Risk Premium because both monetary and fiscal policy heavily influence the ERP over periods of a decade or less, primarily through the influence of monetary policy on fixed income returns, but also through the effect on equities. Expansionary fiscal policy only has a short-run impact on GDP. Fiscal policy influences the ERP by generating deficits because of wars, economic and financial crises, or other factors which influence the economy. Monetary policy is used to redress the problems created by government deficits and economic and financial crises, and impacts the money supply, inflation and interest rates, and thus the ERP.
Changes in interest rates produce a wealth effect through changes in bond prices and an income effect through changes in yields. Falling interest rates, as in the US between 1981 and 2012 benefit fixed income investors through capital gains, but rising interest rates create capital losses. In extreme cases, government policies can completely wipe out an asset class, as happened with German Bonds in the 1920s. Hyperinflation can destroy the value of fixed income investments, or a currency change can wipe out savers by forcing them to convert to a new currency at an unfavorable rate, as happened in Germany in the 1940s. Monetary policy can and has negatively impacted investors, not only creating redistributions, but distorting returns to equities and to fixed income.

This paper argues that different monetary regimes have existed over the past 150 years in the United States that have distorted bond and equity returns and influenced the equity risk premium in different ways. Although fiscal and monetary policies can also distort and influence the price of and return on housing, commodities and other asset classes, these effects will not be addressed here. The analysis will be limited to purely financial assets.

There are two implications of this. At the micro level, investors should adjust the allocation of their portfolios to reflect the impact of monetary policy on asset class returns. At the macro level, different monetary regimes not only influence the ERP, but they create distributional and economic inefficiencies that impact not only investors, but the economy as a whole. Most monetary policy fails to recognize this, concentrating on the need to encourage investment and consumption through manipulating interest rates or the money supply in order to influence GDP and unemployment, while ignoring the impact on asset returns to investors. Distortions to the ERP may last for decades. The full distributional and efficiency costs of these monetary regimes are usually ignored.

MONETARY REGIMES

A monetary regime is the general set of policies the government establishes toward the monetary side of the economy. The monetary regime can be based upon a gold standard or a fiat currency, on fixed or variable exchanges rates, on manipulating short-term and/or long-term interest rates, on controlling inflation or attempting to reduce unemployment, on manipulating reserves or the money supply, etc., or leaving these choices to the market.

The combination of policy choices that are made determines the monetary regime. As long as economic conditions remain favorable, providing economic growth, low unemployment and limited inflation, the monetary regime continues. If the economy falls into a recession or depression, a financial crisis can occur. When the existing monetary regime is no longer seen as a solution to the economy’s problems, the monetary regime will change. Monetary regimes can also change in response to exogenous events, especially wars.

This paper assumes the United States has gone through seven monetary regimes during the past 150 years, and entered into an eighth monetary regime in 2008. Economic crises within each monetary regime led to dissatisfaction with each regime leading to the introduction of a new monetary regime. These monetary regimes are outlined below.

Free Banking (1836-1861, crisis in 1857)—The charter for the Second Bank of the United States expired in 1836. Between 1836 and 1913, the United States had no Central Bank, and until 1861, private banks were free to issue their own currency. The Panic of 1857 was the first world-wide financial crisis. Though the economy largely recovered by 1859, the end of free banking occurred more due to the Civil War than as a solution to the Panic of 1857.

Greenback Era (1861-1873, crisis in 1869)—During the Civil War, the era of Free Banking was replaced by the Greenback Era when paper currency was not convertible into gold. Although many feared a debasement of the currency similar to what happened during the Revolutionary War, the Federal Government eventually returned to the Gold Standard, though this was not the case with the Confederacy where investors lost everything. The principle crisis of this era was Black Friday in 1869 when Jay Gould and others tried unsuccessfully to corner the gold market.

Gold Standard (1873-1913, crisis in 1907)—The US de facto returned to the Gold Standard in 1873 after the “Crime of 1873.” The dollar was convertible into Gold during these years, but the Financial Crisis of 1907 led to the demand for a central bank that could offset the power of J. Pierpont Morgan and other private bankers. The Federal Reserve was created in 1913.

Federal Reserve Era (1913-1933, crisis in 1929)—It was not the creation of the Fed, but World War I that determined the fate of the global economy during those 20 years. World War I created excessive debt throughout the world. The resulting imbalances made a return to the pre-war Gold Standard virtually impossible. Countries were unable to resolve the dislocations created by the debt and inflation created by the war. Attempts to return to a Gold Standard and seek international solutions failed, leading to the Great Depression.

War Economy (1933-1951, post-war inflation)—Because of the lack of an international consensus, each country sought different solutions to the Great Depression, primarily through expanding the role of government. Under Roosevelt, monetary policy was made subservient to fiscal policy and interest rates were controlled as government debt exploded. This led to higher inflation in the US after the war, and to the Treasury Accord of 1951 which allowed the market to once again determine long-term interest rates.

Keynesianism (1951-1979, stagflation in the 1970s)—Expansionary, countercyclical fiscal policy was seen as a way of reducing the fluctuations in the business cycle and creating growth, but excessive monetary expansion combined with the problems of the OPEC crisis, led to stagflation and rising interest rates. This led to dissatisfaction with Keynesianism and attempts to control inflation through monetary policy.

Bubblism (1979-2008, Great Recession of 2008)—Before 1979, the Fed generally targeted bank reserves in the financial system by setting the Fed Funds Rate. In October 1979, Volcker changed this policy to targeting the quantity of money, specifically, non-borrowed reserves; however, primarily due to financial innovations, the Fed’s ability to control non-borrowed reserves and thus the money supply was limited. In October 1982, the Fed once again targeted interest rates rather than the quantity of money. This monetary regime is referred to as Bubblism because the accommodating monetary policies of the Fed after 1982 (the Greenspan put) led to a series of financial bubbles and crises. Although Volcker’s original Monetarist policies of 1979 drove down inflation by allowing interest rates to seek their own level, under Greenspan and Bernanke, low interest rates were used to offset financial recessions including the 1987 Stock Market Crash, the S&L crisis, the Internet Bubble, and 9/11.

Expansionism (2009-) After the financial crisis of 2008, short-term interest rates were driven down through the Fed’s Zero Interest Rate Policy, while quantitative easing and other policies manipulated long-term interest rates. The Fed has committed itself to expanding its balance sheet by buying government and mortgage-backed securities while the federal government has run trillion-dollar deficits after 2008.

Breaking up the past 150 years into these eight monetary regimes is meant to reflect the spirit of each era. Each of them could be broken down into shorter periods when additional policy changes occurred. Moreover, each regime was marked by a significant financial crisis leading to a major change in monetary policy. During these financial crises, returns to financial assets were below average while the economy suffered slow growth and/or inflation. As will be seen below, asset class returns differed substantially under each of these regimes, bringing into question the idea of a constant equity risk premium.

Although fiscal and monetary policy measures are usually framed primarily in terms of how they impact the economy as a whole, these policies also have substantial impacts on returns to investors. Monetary policy that impacts interest rates changes not only the returns to fixed income investors, but impacts the ERP and consequently, the allocation of resources and economic efficiency. If individuals who are saving and investing for their retirement receive lower returns, their wealth and income are impacted.

Falling interest rates increase the wealth of fixed income investors through capital gains, but it reduces income from their wealth. Those who invest in bonds after interest rates fall are hurt by low returns, and do not benefit from the wealth effect. Similarly, when interest rates rise, there is a negative wealth effect, but a positive income effect. Monetary policy not only redistributes wealth and income through inflation and low interest rates, but impacts the allocation of resources and economic efficiency as well. Changes in the monetary regime create uncertainty as well as wealth and income effects.

The ideal monetary regime is one that allows the real side of the economy to allocate resources as efficiently as possible while minimizing the economic cost of the monetary side of the economy to the real economy. Ideally for investors, monetary regimes should change as little as possible. In reality, although central banks may have de jure independence, in practice their policies must accommodate politically-motivated fiscal policy, and consider both the political and economic trade-offs of accommodative monetary policy.

This paper argues that the equity risk premium not only measures the relative returns of stocks, bonds and bills, but it also measures the endogenous distortions to the financial sector created by monetary and fiscal policy. Unfortunately, there are few opportunities to arbitrage these distortions successfully. Fluctuations in the ERP are a measure of the redistributions and inefficiencies created by monetary and fiscal policy. These distortions misallocate resources and may contribute to the severity of the financial and economic crises that occur.

ASSET CLASS RETURNS IN THEORY

The returns to stocks, bonds and bills depend upon different factors. Bills are cash instruments that provide return with no risk. They should compensate the investor for inflation, and their rate of return should equal the inflation rate in the long run with some allowance for the time value of money. The return on default-risk-free Government Bonds should equal the growth in nominal GDP since this is the opportunity cost of money over long periods of time. The return on corporate equities should depend on the growth in future corporate profits, allowing for the riskiness of the company and its securities. The value of a company, and thus its stock, is the present value of future cash flows to investors. Utility stocks provide different returns than do biotech companies, and corporate bonds, preferred stocks and common stocks all have different returns because of the risk of receiving the firm’s future cash flows.

The optimal monetary regime is one that minimizes the cost to the real economy of the financial system. The Fed’s directive is to control inflation while maintaining growth and minimizing unemployment. These goals cannot be achieved simultaneously, so the Fed must look at the trade-offs between controlling inflation and increasing economic output. Similarly, the Fed needs to consider the impact of its policies on the allocation of financial resources, the wealth and income effects that occur for investors and savers, and how the Fed’s choices may lead to a financial crisis which imposes costs on the economy.

Monetary regimes impact inflation and thus the returns to bills. Investors try to predict future inflation rates, economic growth rates and future profits, and reallocate investments to reflect their expectations. Similarly, investors attempt to predict the present value of future cash flows to different corporations and change their investments in equities accordingly.

If fixed-income investors underestimate future inflation, as occurred in the 1970s, they receive negative returns. If the government artificially lowers interest rates, as in the 1940s and 2010s, bondholders have less income. Similarly, unwarranted expectations of economic growth, fueled by low interest rates or an expansive monetary regime, can lead to an expansion in the PE ratio for equities (as in the 1960s and 1990s), leading to excessive returns to shareholders in one decade, which can lead to a reversion to the mean in the decade that follows.

Different fundamental factors drive returns to equities and fixed income. Equity returns are primarily driven by GDP growth and nominal fixed income returns by inflation. Fiscal and monetary policy also impact returns to both in different ways, and different factors drive the wealth and income effects on returns to both. For these reasons, the time cycles of bull and bear markets in equities and fixed income differ, and this combination of factors makes it very difficult to arbitrage deviations from the average ERP, even when this persists for a decade or more. Consequently, it is important that investors understand how the existing monetary regime impacts returns to equities and fixed income and the distortions and misallocations the existing monetary regime creates.

Asset Class Returns under Different Monetary Regimes

The table below shows real returns to different asset classes as well as the Equity/Government Bond Risk Premium, GDP and per capita GDP.

Two questions are paramount here: 1) Have the monetary regimes impacted the returns to different asset classes? 2) Have these returns differed under the Federal Reserve and the era before the creation of the Fed? The bar chart below shows clear differences in the returns under different monetary regimes.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE MONETARY REGIMESAN OVERVIEW OF THE MONETARY REGIMES

TheGreenback Era was marked by inflation during the Civil War and deflation afterthe war so the United States could eliminate the Gold Premium relative to paperdollars. The low inflation rate over this period masks the rise and fall inprices that occurred between 1861 and 1873. People remembered that theContinental Congress had defaulted on its obligations and created inflationmaking paper money almost worthless.Althoughthe Federal Government returned to the Gold Standard after the Civil War, theConfederacy defaulted on its obligations wiping out holders of Confederatefinancial assets.

The strong returns to stocks andbonds during the Greenback Era reflect, in part, the fact that the stock marketwas at a low point when the war began and bond yields had peaked.The stock market rose continually during thewar, peaking in 1873 while bond yields fell from 1861 until the early 1900s(Figure 3). This pattern continued during the Gold Standard Regime with strongbull markets occurring between 1876 and 1881 and between 1896 and 1901, withstocks fluctuating within ranges during the rest of the period between 1878 and1913.Despite the sharp break in 1907,the market immediately bounced back.Themost notable fact about the period before 1913 was the stability of prices, thecurrency and of government spending, and the relative stability of the EquityRisk Premium.

Although the Federal Reserve wascreated in 1913, the more important event was the start of World War I in 1914. The result in the U.S. was double-digitinflation from 1916 to 1919 and deflation through 1932. The inflation duringand after the war created wild fluctuations for investors with strong lossesthrough 1921, a huge bull market through 1929 and a sharp crash to 1932.Bond yields rose through 1921, then declinedsteadily until the 1940s.

The creation of the Fed coincidedwith the collapse of the Pound Standard, often referred to as the Gold Standard, after World War I. Britain was unable to bear the burden of the financial and economic costs of World War I, and was unable to return to theirold parity in the 1920s. Financial and economic conditions in other countries were even worse with hyperinflation wiping out German investors.The inability or unwillingness of the United States to replace the Pound Standard with a Dollar Standard until Bretton Woods contributed to the economic problems of the 1930s.

RETURNS DURING CRISIS PERIODS AT THE END OF MONETARY REGIMES

Since each monetary regime covers long periods of time, the data can mask the large swings and returns that occur within each monetary regime. The change from the Gold Standard to the creation of a Central Bank, from 1930s deflation to Keynesian inflation, from the emphasis on Keynesian Fiscal Policy to Monetary Policy occurred because existing monetary regimes failed to provide growth to the economy at low inflation rates. It will be shown here that during each crisis period, investors suffered substantially, contributing to the demand for a change in monetary regimes.

Although we are focusing on monetary regimes, it remains true that fiscal policy influences GDP growth and returns as well. Fiscal and monetary policy do not exist in a vacuum. Each of the crises at the end of each monetary regime was influenced by outside “real world” events which monetary policy could only react to.

The important point to recognize here is that during each crisis, the existing monetary regime was no longer able to solve the problems that existed. Whether each monetary regime laid the seeds of its own destruction, or if the results would have been different under a different monetary regime is difficult to determine. Nevertheless, the crisis created a need for a “solution” to the existing economic problems and a change in monetary regimes.

The table below shows that returns to investors at the end of each monetary regime were substantially lower than the average for each period. Either equities or bonds provided negative returns during each of these crises save one. In four of the six periods, a portfolio invested half in equities and half in bonds generated negative returns during each crisis except for the Great Recession and the Black Friday Panic.

Given this data, it is easy to see why there was dissatisfaction with the existing monetary regime and a demand for change. Each crisis led to an important change in monetary policy that set the tone for the next few decades: returning to a de facto Gold Standard in 1873, creating the Federal Reserve in 1913, subordinating monetary policy to fiscal policy after the election of Roosevelt in 1933, allowing the market to set government bond yields after 1951, controlling inflation through activist monetary policy after 1979, and the combination of a Zero Interest Rate Policy and Quantitative easing after 2008.

Although the Bubble Recession provided high returns to fixed income, this was offset by the negative returns to equities.The severity of the Great Recession of 2008 produced a significant change in monetary policy, lowering interest rates to zero and using the Fed’s Balance Sheet as an important tool to combat slow growth.For this reason, we consider these policies a regime change within our paradigm. 

http://www.globalfinancialdata.com/expansionism-the-impact-of-the-feds-monetary-regime/ 

Editado 30 de Outubro de 2020 por Bedrock

[Bedrock 137]

Qual será a situação atual na montanha russa dos emojis, nos mercados acionistas?

[Bedrock 137]

https://www.visualcapitalist.com/majority-advertising-dollars-spent-online/

Editado 30 de Outubro de 2020 por Bedrock

[-------- 2582]

https://pt.fundspeople.com/news/chart-of-the-week-republicanos-ou-democratas-quem-apresenta-melhor-desempenho-a-gerir-o-s-p-500

"Existe a teoria, amplamente veiculada junto dos meios político, empresarial e media, de que os Presidentes Republicanos apresentam políticas “pró-mercados”; no entanto, esta tese não é comprovada pelos resultados históricos dos últimos 70 anos".

[Bedrock 137]

Será que se está a aproximar o turnover do investimento de empresas do tipo growth (tecnológicas) para empresas do tipo value?

Historicamente, houve sempre turnovers entre os 2 tipos de investimento, exatamente porque são diferentes, tal como há um turnover/transferência térmica entre um corpo sobreaquecido e a sua envolvente mais fria.

As ações das empresas do tipo growth nos EUA , especialmente as tecnológicas, estão numa enorme bolha, se bem que não é o mesmo que em 2000, onde as ações das empresas de tecnologia não tiveram lucros. Agora, é diferente, pois as ações das tecnológicas têm avaliações extremamente altas em relação aos seus lucros. E isso pode não fazer diferença alguma, já que a soma dos pesos das ações de tecnologia e comunicação atingiu um recorde histórico este ano.

No entanto, o setor de maior peso tende depois a apresentar desempenho inferior, porque esse peso é dado pela capitalização bolsista desse tipo de empresas, e mantendo-se o n.º de ações em circulação, o excesso da capitalização bolsista é devido à valorização excessiva da cotação das suas ações, sendo que, a partir de uma certa altura, essas empresas que se tornaram demasiado gordas (grande capitalização bolsista), ficam reféns ou condicionadas pelo excesso de gordura, uma vez que devido à excessiva valorização das suas ações, a possível margem de expansão ficou muito estreita e o racional é, a qualquer momento, começarem a desvalorizar, perdendo parte dessa gordura e assim ficarem mais saudáveis, em termos dos seus reais fundamentais, e, desse modo, poderem voltar a estar apetecíveis para o investimento bolsista. A grande questão é saber quando o momentum da tendência em alta vai quebrar, e a razão dessa quebra é sempre dada pela falta de suporte dos fundamentais dessas empresas em relação às suas valorizações excessivas. 

Em algum momento, a maré irá mudar para a valorização das empresas value baratas, nem que seja o capital privado a absorver as ações de valor do mercado. O momentum e as tendências de mercado, mais tarde ou mais cedo, são sempre quebrados, o que nunca quebra é a matemática do investimento: se as empresas custam menos, em relação ao seu património líquido e lucros, então elas irão valorizar.

 

Editado 30 de Outubro de 2020 por Bedrock

[Vidolz 295]

Porque não um misto entre os 2?

[Mouro Emprestado 639]

há 1 hora, D@vid disse:

https://pt.fundspeople.com/news/chart-of-the-week-republicanos-ou-democratas-quem-apresenta-melhor-desempenho-a-gerir-o-s-p-500

"Existe a teoria, amplamente veiculada junto dos meios político, empresarial e media, de que os Presidentes Republicanos apresentam políticas “pró-mercados”; no entanto, esta tese não é comprovada pelos resultados históricos dos últimos 70 anos".

Foi um presidente republicano que saiu do padrão ouro, de forma a poder-se endividar até ao céu eheheheh.

[Patanisca 1223]

Já dizia um grande sábio:

Citação

As dívidas não se pagam. Gerem-se.

Pago um fino a quem souber o nome do sábio. Mas tem que ser no meu concelho de residência...

[Visitante Fastolph]

Bom Dia,

Sabem-me dizer 2 fundos que possa adquirir através do best que mimetizem o sp500 e nasdaq?

Através da app do banco best é possivel verificar a evolução grafica dos fundos de investimento? 

[EagleOne 58]

há 6 minutos, Patanisca disse:

Já dizia um grande sábio:

Pago um fino a quem souber o nome do sábio. Mas tem que ser no meu concelho de residência...

No dicionário da Beira-Baixa é gerem-se do verbo gerar e geram-se do verbo gerir

[P2P Money Maker 250]

há 12 minutos, Patanisca disse:

Já dizia um grande sábio:

Pago um fino a quem souber o nome do sábio. Mas tem que ser no meu concelho de residência...

Socrates (não o filósofo)

[5coroas 1402]

há 6 minutos, P2P Money Maker disse:

Socrates (não o filósofo)

Não eram ambos filósofos?!?